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Not knowing you know: a new objection to the
defeasibility theory of knowledge
JOHN N. WILLIAMS
Foley (2012: 93–98) and Turri (2012: 215–19) have recently given objections
to the defeasibility theory of propositional knowledge. Here, I give an objec-
tion of a quite different stripe by looking at what the theory must say about
knowing that you know. I end with some remarks on how this objection
relates to rival theories and how this might be a worry for some of these.
What might be called the early defeasibility theory of propositional knowl-
edge may be formulated as follows.
You know that p just in case you have a justified true belief that p and
there is no defeater D of your justification for believing that p
where
D is a defeater of your justification for believing that p just in case it is a
truth such that believing it would render your belief that p unjustified.1
This theory deals nicely with Gettier cases such Lamborghini, offered
recently by Turri (2012: 215) and adapted as follows.
Wishing to impress you, your student tells you that he owns a
Lamborghini and affords you excellent evidence that does (he gives
you a ride, tells you about the purchase, parks it in his garage and so
on). Reasoning that he behaves just like a Lamborghini-owner, you
believe on that basis that he owns one. Unbeknownst to you, he has
promised to take care of his cousin’s Lamborghini while she is on a trip.
But unbeknownst to you and him, she has died just after this promise,
leaving him the Lamborghini in an unopened will.
Most would agree that you have a justified belief that your student owns a
Lamborghini that is luckily true and thus does not amount to knowledge.
Because you justify that belief by inducing it from the truth that he behaves
just like a Lamborghini-owner, your ignorance cannot be explained by
Clark’s (1963) influential ‘no false lemmas’ proposal that you know that
p only if you do not infer that p from a falsehood. In contrast, the early
defeasibility theory does explain it; you do not know that your student owns
a Lamborghini because there is a truth that would render you unjustified in
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believing that he owns one if you believed it, namely that he has promised to
take care of his cousin’s Lamborghini while she is on a trip.
The early theory is too strong, however, as shown by Lehrer and Paxson’s
(1969) case of Tom Grabit, adapted as follows.
Using your reliable vision and memory, you see someone who looks just
like Tom Grabit stealing a book at the library, and on this basis believe
that he stole a book. Unbeknownst to you, Tom’s mother claims that he
is away on a trip and has an identical twin who is in the library. But still
unbeknownst to you, she is demented. Tom did steal a book.
Surely you know that Tom stole a book, but there is a truth that would
render you unjustified in believing that Tom stole one were you to believe
it, namely that Tom’s mother claims that he is away on a trip and has an
identical twin who is in the library. Hence, the later defeasibility theory
originating from Klein (1981):
You know that p just in case you have a justified true belief that p and
there is no undefeated defeater D of your justification for believing that p
where
D is defeated by D* just in case D* is a truth such that believing it, in
addition to believing D, preserves your original justification for believing
that p.
This explains why you know that Tom stole a book. There is a truth, namely
that Tom’s mother claims that he is away on a trip and has an identical twin
who is in the library. There is also another truth, namely that she is demen-
ted. If you were to believe both truths, then your original justification for
believing that Tom stole a book would be preserved. Your justification is
ultimately undefeated.
Foley (2012: 93–98) and Turri (2012: 215–18) argue that the later defeasi-
bility theory is too weak (in incorrectly including cases of ignorance), whereas
Feldman (2003: 34–38) and Plantinga (1996: 320–22) argue that it is too
strong (in incorrectly excluding cases of knowledge).2 What seems to have
gone unnoticed all this time is that any version of the theory is unsatisfactory,
even if it is neither too strong nor too weak. This is because when you have a
posteriori knowledge, it prohibits you from knowing that you have it.
Setting external world scepticism aside, you may use your reliable percep-
tual faculties to observe falling rain, and on that basis come to know that it is
2 I am greatly indebted to Claudio de Almeida for alerting me to this with de Almeida and
Fett 2015, in which they argue persuasively that all four arguments fail, and also for his
useful background information on the literature and his helpful discussion, all of which
aided me considerably in writing the foregoing part of this note.
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raining. Introspecting upon your current mental states, you might also come
to know that you know this.
It is plausible that if the satisfaction of a condition at least partly consti-
tutes an instance of a concept, then knowing that such an instance obtains
requires you to know that the condition is satisfied. For example, since the
concept of a triangle is at least partly constituted by it being three-sided, you
know that a figure is a triangle only if you know that it is three-sided.
Applying this principle to the concept of knowledge, since the concept of
your knowledge is partly constituted by your believing what you know, in
knowing that you know that p you know that you believe that p. For exam-
ple, in knowing that you know that at least one of your students owns a
Lamborghini, you know that you believe that at least one of your students
owns one. As another case, in knowing that you know that it is raining, you
know that you believe that it is raining.
Now the early defeasibility theory has it that your knowledge that it is
raining is at least partly constituted by it being the case that there is no truth
such that believing it would render you unjustified in believing that it is
raining, or in other words, that
Every truth is not such that if you were to believe it then this would
render you unjustified in believing that it is raining.
Clearly, you cannot know this a priori. Even if every truth is as just
described above, with the result that the defeasibility theory allows you
knowledge that it is raining, you cannot tell in advance that this is so.
You cannot foresee all threats to your justification of your belief that it is
raining. This is as it should be, because although you know that it is raining,
you cannot know a priori that you have this knowledge. The only other way
for you to know it is to know every truth and ascertain that each is not such
that if you were to believe it then this would render you unjustified in believ-
ing that it is raining. Although this is properly an a posteriori way of know-
ing, in fact it is not a way that you follow when you introspect on your
mental states in order to know that you know that it is raining. More
importantly, it is not a way that you can follow, for the simple reason that
being less than omniscient, you cannot know every truth.
The same point applies to the later theory. You cannot know a priori that
Every truth is not such that if you were to believe it, then this would
render you unjustified in believing that it is raining, unless there is
another truth your belief in which would preserve your original
justification.
Although every truth might be as just described above, you cannot tell in
advance that this is so. Reflection will not enable you to recognize the ulti-
mate victory of your justification. Nor can you know every truth and
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ascertain that each is not as just described above, since you cannot know
every truth. So while the later theory also allows you to know that it is
raining, it likewise prohibits your knowing that you know this.
Restricting defeaters to truths that are ‘relevant’ to your justification for
believing that p will not avoid this problem. Suppose that relevance can be
defined without mention of your knowledge that p, thus avoiding circularity.
Suppose further that every truth relevant to your justification for believing
that it is raining is not such that if you were to believe it then this would
render you unjustified in believing that it is raining. In that case the defeasi-
bility theory allows you to know that it is raining. Yet there is no way that
you can know in advance which truths will turn out to be relevant, with the
same result that you cannot know that you know that it is raining.
A satisfactory theory of knowledge need not by itself establish that there is
knowledge, or even that it is possible. Nonetheless, any satisfactory theory
must allow you not only to have a posteriori knowledge, but also to know
that you have it. No defeasibility theory does allow it.3 So no defeasibility
theory is satisfactory.
This problem stems from the very notion of defeasibility. Part of what this
means is that it is not commonalities that we should find problematic when
comparing the defeasibility theory to its rivals. In contrast to the defeasibility
theory, a simple theory that only demands justification, very broadly con-
ceived, for your true belief that p will say that for you to know that you know
that p, you must know that you are justified, likewise conceived, in believing
that p.
In contrast again, other theories include the causal theory, the truth-
tracking theory, safety-centric theories and virtue-epistemological theories.
Each will make different demands on you in order for you to know that
you know that p. These will be your knowledge of appropriate causes of
your belief that p, your knowledge that your belief that p is, under some
description, sensitive to falsehood or safely true, or your knowledge that your
belief that p is, under some description, epistemically virtuous.
None of this is to say that these rival demands are not problematic. That
worrying question may be usefully pursued elsewhere. What it does show,
however, is that the defeasibility theory is unsatisfactory in a way that its
rivals are not.
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3 This point also holds against those such as Kvanvig (2009:145) who claim only that a
necessary condition of your knowing that p is that you have justification for your true
belief that p that is ultimately undefeated.
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Knowing by way of tracking and epistemic closure
MURALI RAMACHANDRAN
1. Introduction
Originally, tracking accounts of knowledge – notably, Dretske’s (1971) and
Nozick’s (1981) – were motivated by putative counter-examples to epistemic
closure. Dretske claims, for example, that a subject at a zoo may know
[Z] that the animal in the pen is a zebra, and know that [Z] entails [:M]
that the animal in the pen is not a mule cleverly painted to look like a zebra,
but not be in a position to know [:M] itself. Nozick’s focus is on radical
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